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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Decree of Divorce forming the basis for this appeal
was entered May 12, 1987, in the Sixth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah and constitutes a final judgment as that
term is defined in Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A Notice of appeal meeting the requirements of Rule 3 of
the Rules of the Court of Appeals was timely filed within the
time allowed by Rule 4, and all the required fees have been
paid.
Jurisdiction is conferred under the provisions of
§78-2(a)-3(g) and §30-3-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Donald Lloyd Jefferies is the father of Joycelyn Jefferies,
age 37.

Eva Louise Jefferies is her mother.

Mr. Jefferies

files this appeal seeking review of the child support provisions of a Decree of Divorce which dissolved the marriage
between the parties to this action and awarded a contract
receivable directly to the child.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Does the Trial court have jurisdiction to remove

ownership of a marital asset from litigating parties in a
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Contract and giving it directly to an adult daughter whom the
Court found to be incompetent to care for herself.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
The case was tried to the court on April 23, 1987. Mrs.
Jefferies presented evidence that the child was incompetent
and argued that certain of the parties accumulated assets
should be distributed to that daughter, (Transcript, p. 59).
Mr. Jefferies is before this Court questioning the jurisdiction
of the Trial Court to do that.

He is not challenging his

responsibilities to support the child if the Trial Court's
determination that she is incompetent is upheld.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 12, 1987, the Court referred to above granted Eva
Louise Jefferies a Decree of Divorce (Transcript, p. 116),
which became final on that date.
divided and debts disposed of.

At that time property was
In so doing, the Court

provided for the support of Joycelyn Jefferies, a daughter
of the litigating parties, who was at that time 37 years old,
(Transcript, p. 117), whom the Court found incompetent to
care for herself by awarding to her all payments receivable
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract owned by the parties
and payable each month in the amount of $1385.00 for the next
28.9 years. Mr. Jefferies files this appeal from those findings

_ L -

and that portion of the decree distributing the contract to
Joycelyn directly.
Mr. and Mrs. Jefferies were married on January 16, 1943,
at Evanston, Wyoming, and were until the time of this divorce
husband and wife.

There were four children born as issue of the

marriage, none of whom were minors on the date of the Decree
of Divorce, (Transcript, p. 4-5). One of these children,
Joycelyn Jefferies, is presently 37 years of age. Although
Joycelyn has been intermittently employed for short periods of
time, she has been supported for the most part by her parents
all of her life, (Transcript, p. 59-60).
At one time the parties owned the El Rancho Motel
located at 1105 South State Street in Provo, Utah.

The

parties sold it to William Reed Esplin and Paula M. Esplin
by Warranty Deed on August 10, 1986.

(R 29).

The parties

entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated August 10,
1976, as sellers, with William Reed Esplin and Paula M. Esplin
as buyers. Under the terms of the contract, there was approximately $178,655 due and payable to the parties at the time of
the divorce decree at a rate of $1385.00 per month, and which
contract accrues interest at a rate of 8.57o.

(R 29).

The

Trial Court found that the contract receivable should be awarded
to the child, Joycelyn as her sole and separate property.

(R 28).

The Court emphasized that it was necessary to make a provision
for the support of this child, even though she was no longer a
minor, because of the belief that if the Court did not make such
a provision, that the child would eventually become a ward of

- 5-

the State.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Jefferies makes this appeal asserting that the Trial
Court erred in making an arbitrary determination of the amount
of child support awarded as well as the source from which the
support will be derived, namely the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

Specifically, the Court appears to have failed to

take into consideration the provisions of §78-45-1 of the
Utah Code which provides the relevant factors that must be considered by a Court in making an award for child support.

It

does not appear from the record that the Court had any significant evidence before it as to what Joycelynfs needs actually
amounted to.

(R 34).

Secondly, by awarding to the daughter the Real Estate Contract,
the Court has created an inflexible system for support that
will be more than adequate now, but less than adequate in the
future, or it may not be needed in the future at all.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
It is the position of the appellant that the Trial Court
incorrectly determined the amount of child support awarded for
the benefit of the parties' adult daughter because of the
Court's failure to consider and apply the relevant factors

- 6 -

necessary in determining prospective support, which are set
forth in §78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended).
In questioning the Trial Court's holding, the appellant does
not contend that he does not have a responsibility for the
continuing support of Joycelyn as long as she needs it. In
addition to the natural desire as her father to aid in her
support, Mr. Jefferies is mindful of the fact the Utah Code
§78-45-3 requires that

f,

every man shall support his child...ff

The fact that Joycelyn has reached the age of majority appears
to be irrelevant to the issue of support considering that
§78-45-2(4) of the Code defines child as ,f. . . a son or
daughter under the age of 18 and a son or daughter of any age
who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient
means.11

This statute is supported by Garrand v. Garrand, 615

P.2d 422, (Utah 1980), which held that the Trial Court properly
required the defendant husband to pay child support after the
child had reached 21 years of age where tfte child was retarded
and incapable of self support.
Appellant's contention, however, is that the amount of
support was determined arbitrarily and without regard to the
provisions of §78-45-7 of the Utah Code, which particularly
defines the elements that are to be considered in making such
a determination.

Pursuant to the statute referred to, the

Court must consider:
"(a) The standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties;
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(c) The ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) The need of the obligee;
(f) The responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others."
This is by no means an exhaustive list of elements which
might be considered;

however, it is Mr. Jefferies contention

that the Trial Court considered only a few of the statutory
elements listed above.

Bernard v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 at

894 and 895 (Utah, 1981) is a case which examines the precise
issue of how a Trial Court should go about determining the
appropriate amount of child support.

In that case, the

Supreme Court held that it would not disturb the Trial Court's
exercise of discretion unless it is shown that the Trial Court
failed to apply the relevant factors including, but limited to,
those found in §78-45-7.
"This Court will not disturb the Trial Court's
exercise of discretion unless we form a definite and
firm conviction that the Court below committed a
cl^ar error of judgment in the conclusion it reached
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.11
In the transcript of the proceedings at page 60 and following, there is some testimony by Mrs. Jefferies regarding
Joycelyn's ability to maintain employment.
"Q.

Now, as it relates to her ability to support
herself, does she have the ability to stay
employed.

A.

No.

Q.

What happens when she gets employed?

A.

Well, when she gets employed, the last employment
she had she lived --

Q.

How long ago, by the way?

A.

That's only been about a year ago, and she had
five different homes that she was a nanny in six
months because she couldn't, she just couldn't do
the work. She'd get emotionally upset.

Q.

As a nanny, did she have the responsibility with
the children and with keeping the house up?

A.

Yes. And she just couldn't do any more."

The above testimony is fairly all that was contained in the
proceeding with regard to the elements which must be considered.
At the same time, this testimony is not evidence that Joycelyn
is unemployable in some other type of work which might not require
higher mental and emotional capacity, nor does it indicate that
her capacity will not improve at some tim6 in the future. The
Court made no findings as to the standard of living of the
parties; relative wealth and income, and ability of the parents
to earn; the overall needs of Joycelyn; her capacity to earn,
even if not as a nanny

or in other related work; her age and

life expectancy; the age of Mr. Jefferies; his obligation to
support others; and the fact that Mr. Jefferies had relied on^this
contract as his retirement.
The Court, in awarding support to Joycelyn through the
vehicle of a contract receivable, has made a very inflexible
decision that does not make provisions for possible changes in
the future.

This decision does not anticipate Joycelyn's

possible improvement, nor does the decree address the possibility
of her untimely death.

In making such an unusual award for the

support of an incapacitated adult child, Appellant urges that
these are all things which the Court should have considered;

- Q -

and maybe it did; but the Findings of Fact do not so indicate.
Appellant argues that the $1,385.00 per month provided by
the contract is an arbitrary and excessive amount to award to
Joycelyn absent any kind of a showing of special need and
absent evidence that she cannot work and will never be able
to care for, herself.

In Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597, at

599, (Utah, 1979), the Supreme Court found it a denial of due
process to the obligor spouse for the Court to assess the obligor
for public assistance benefits in the nature of child support
obtained by obligee without considering the relevant factors
such as relative wealth and income of all parties; and the
ability of the parties to earn income.

See also Mecham v.

Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, (Utah, 1977).
Based on the language used by the Court in making the Order
and Ruling (Transcript p. 117), it appears that the Court
worried somewhat over the welfare of the child but only to the
extent that it hoped to prevent the child from becoming a ward
of the State of Utah.

While this is certainly an understandable

concern, Appellant believes that his statutory right to due process
of law was forgotten.

In light of the circumstances, and the clear

intent of both parties to see that their daughter will be taken
care of even when they are no longer available to care for her,
this arbitrary award by the Trial Court was truly excessive.
POINT II
As has been previously said, there is no question about the
responsibility of both of the parties to this action to provide

ongoing support for the maintenance of their daughter, regardless of her age, if she is incapacitated as the Trial Court
found.

The only finding of fact made by the Court, however,

is to the effect that the parents have been supporting her for
her entire life, and that if support is not ongoing, she may
some day become a ward of the state (Transcript, page 117).
The finding that is challenged, however, is that it is necessary
to remove the major asset from the marital property accumulated by
these parties over the course of a forty-four-year marriage
and give it directly to one of their children, regardless of
what that child's needs may be.

It is submitted that to the extent

that the Court did in fact do that, (Transcript, p. 117, line 21),
it exceeded the authority granted to the Court under the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act, §78-45-1 through §78-45-7, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as Amended).
The question of whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction
to take marital property from divorce litigants and give it
directly to a dependent appears to be one of first impression
in this State.

An argument can be made that this should be the

law, but the legislature of the State of Utah has not seen fit to
go that far under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act
cited above.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested
that Findings No. 6 & 7 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, (R 28), and Finding No. 2 of the
1 T

Decree of Divorce, (R 29), should be reversed and the matter
remanded to the Trial Court for further findings and an appropriate order of support and disposition of the future contract
proceeds in order for the issue of support for Joycelyn to be
properly re-evaluated pursuant to the applicable statutes.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of August, 1987.

Noall T. Wootton
Attorney for Appellant
Donald Lloyd Jefferies
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, DONALD LLOYD
JEFFERIES were mailed, postage prepaid, on the J/*6f&ay
August, 1987, to the following:
Richard B. Johnson
1327 South 800 East
Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-2

78-45-1. Short title.
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "[t]his
act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1957, Chapter 110, which appears as
§§ 78-45-1 to 78-45-4, 78-45-5 to 78-45-7,
78-45-8, 78-45-9, and 78-45-10 to 78-45-13.

Cross-References. — Child support collection, Chapter 45d of this title.
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of
this title.
Uniform child custody jurisdiction, Chapter
45c of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Postmajority disability as reviving
parental duty to support child, 48 A.L.R.4th
919.
Child support: court's authority to remsti-

78-45-2.

tute parent's support obligation after terms of
pnor decree have been fulfilled, 48 A.L.R.4th
953.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(2) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(3) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed.
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under the age of 18 years and a
son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means.
(5) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a stepparent.
(6) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive parent or one living with the natural or adoptive parent as a common
law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in a state
which recognizes the validity of common law marriages.
(7) "Stepchild" means any child with a stepparent.
(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and specifically include periodic payment pursuant to pension or
retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings shall
specifically include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital
assets.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch.
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.
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78-45-3. Duty of man.
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she is
in need.
History; L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch.
140, § 3.
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport
of children, § 76-7-201.

Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Child's right to support.
Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
—Retarded child.
—Transfer.
Duty to support wife.
—Termination.
Divorce.
Estoppel to assert duty to support.
Wrongful death action.
—Medical and burial expenses.
Child's right to support.
A child's right to support is his own right,
not his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976).
Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to
support their children; however, the extent of
that duty is not without limitation, and where
the question of child support has been submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more
general statutory duty of support becomes circumscribed by the more specific duty imposed
by the court. In re C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah
1983).
—Retarded child.
Trial court properly required husband to pay
child support after the child reached 21 years
of age where the child was retarded and incapable of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615
P.2d 422 (Utah 1980).
—Transfer.
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to
support his children by purporting to transfer
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v.
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).
Duty to support wife.
—Termination.
Divorce.
Divorce terminates husband's duty to sup-

port his wife except for any obligations imposed by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley,
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).
Estoppel to assert duty to support.
Children have a right to support, but where
their mother and her second husband had provided it, mother was estopped to demand that
her first husband also contribute support; since
her demand was not in the nature of a claim
for reimbursement, to grant it would have been
in effect to give the children "double support"
to which they were not entitled. Wasescha v.
Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976).
Wrongful death action.
—Medical and burial expenses.
District court erred in deducting proceeds of
medical and burial insurance policy from
amount of special damages in action by father
for wrongful death of son, since father was under legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost of
medical care and burial expenses for son and
was thus entitled to recover amounts reasonably expended for that purpose; mere fact that
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to
protect against such contingencies should not
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hill t 21
Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968).
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78-45-4

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife § 329 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child § 54.
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 15;
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 55 to 58.
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-

cluding action! for determination of paternity
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Liability of barent for support of child institutionalized b^ juvenile court, 59 A.L.R.3d 636.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <*=* 4;
Parent and Child «=> 3.1(2).

78-45-4, Duty of woman.
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband
when he is in need.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 4.
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport
of children, § 76-7-201.

Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
—Transfer.
—Termination.
Divorce.
Duty to support children.
—Judicial limitation.
Parents are "duty-bound" to support their
children; however, the extent of that duty is
not without limitation, and where the question
of child support has been submitted to a court
of competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon
has been obtained, the more general statutory
duty of support becomes circumscribed by the
more specific duty imposed by the court. In re
C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983).
—Transfer.
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to

support her children by purporting to transfer
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v.
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).
—Termination.
Divorce.
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding
is not required to pay support, neither terminates the children's right, nor obviates the
mother's responsibility, for such support as
may be determinedat some future time. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife § 334; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and
Child § 54.
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 16;
67A CJ.S. Parent and Child § 54.
A.L.R. — Liability of parent for support of

child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59
A.L.R.3d 636.
Wife's possession of independent means as
affecting her right to child support pendente
lite, 60 A.L.R.3d 832.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <*=» 4;
Parent and Child «= 3.1(3).
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78-45-4,3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support.
Notwithstanding § 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or stepparent
whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the primary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of majority.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 120, § 1.

Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.
Period of minority, § 15-2-1.

78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion
and Nonsupport §§ 32, 95.
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 14
et seq.

Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=> 4;
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5).

78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 6.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.

Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147
et seq.

C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts, § 291.
Key Numbers. — Courts «=* 156.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Assessment formula for temporary support.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances
has occurred, the court, in determining the amount of prospective support,
shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
641
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(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor foif the support of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the cotirt shall determine and assess
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any;
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in
support of spouse and children.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or
other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the
support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which can be
readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's
earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. The assessment formula shall be established by the Department of Social Services and
periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council, under Subsection 78-3-21(3).
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch.
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amendment added Subsection (4); and made minor
changes m style.
Cross-References. — Creation of Department of Social Services, § 63-35-3.

Creation of Judicial Council, Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 12; § 78-3-21.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of
this titlel

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assessment of arrearages
—Due process requirements.
Modification of support.
—Divorce decree.
State recovery of assistance to child.
Assessment of arrearages.
—Due process requirements.
Due process of law requires that court must
consider the relevant factors set out in this section in assessment of obligor for public assistance benefits received by the obligee prior to a
court order for support. Roberts v. Roberts, 592
P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
Modification of support.
—Divorce decree.
The divorce decree establishes the duty of
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and

a complaint under this section to modify that
duty of support is improper. Mecham v.
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977).
State recovery of assistance to child.
State, which was joined as a party to the divorce action before court entered order determining husband's obligation for child support,
was entitled to reimbursement from the husband for assistance furnished the child before
entry of the order for support in the amount,
based upon the relevant factors as set out in
this section, as set out in the support order.
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband
and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child § 54 et seq.

C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 14
et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50.
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <s= 4;
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5).

78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment —
Insurance coverage.
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the court shall include in its order a provision assigning responsibility
for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for
the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, § 3.

Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance
and health care of parties, § 30-3-5.

78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support
where justice requires.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 8.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, § 78-3-4.

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
state Department of Social Services may proceed pursuant to this act or any
other applicable statute, either on its own behalf or on behalf of the obligee, to
enforce the obligee's right of support against the obligor. Whenever any court
action is commenced by the state Department of Social Services to enforce
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the attorney
general or the county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to
represent that department.
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to recover support due or owing
that obligee whether under this act or any other applicable statute without
first filing an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced
stating whether that obligee has received public assistance from any source. If
the obligee has received public assistance, the obligee shall join the Department of Social Services as a party plaintiff in the action. The Department of
Social Services shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1) of this section.
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Frances E. BERNARD, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John W. ATTEBURY, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16985.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 9, 1981.
Father appealed from that portion of
consolidated order of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno,
J. Pro Tern, which required him to pay
$2,600 to mother for child support and arrearages in support payments. The Supreme Court, Maughan, C. J., held that: (1)
trial court's decision to award one child
prospective support did not constitute a
clear error of judgment; (2) there was substantial evidence to support trial court's
finding that one child was not emancipated
from parental custody; and (3) doctrine of
res judicata could not be invoked by father
to foreclose consideration of mother's claim
for past-due child support payments.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
1. Divorce <&=>2
The Supreme Court must apply the
laws of Utah in determining the appropriateness of imposing a duty of child support.
U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7.
2. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(8)
While child support payments become
unalterable debts as they accrue and a periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after installment has become due, trial
court may exercise its discretion in imposing a duty of support prospectively. U.C.A.
1953, 77-^61a-24.
3. Parent and Child <$=> 3.3(10)
The Supreme Court will not disturb
trial court's exercise of discretion in determining appropriateness of imposing child
support duty unless Supreme Court forms

ddfimte and firm conviction that court below committed clear error of judgment in
conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7.
4. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(8)
Decision of trial court to award one
child prospective support, reached after
weighing of information concerning whereabouts and living situation of child, did not
constitute a clear error of judgment. U.C.
A.|l953, 77-61a-7.
5. Parent and Child *=> 3.3(5)
Substantial evidence supported trial
court's decision that one child was not
emancipated from parental custody for purposes of determining child support. U.C.A.
1953, 77-61a-7.
6. Judgment <s=>634
The doctrine of res judicata renders a
final judgment, on the merits, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of
same issues.
7. Judgment <s=>650
Before doctrine of res judicata is applicable, final judgment embracing all issues
must be entered and preliminary or interim
rulings which do not represent final determination do not rise to dignity of res judicata
8. Judgment <s=>658
Where previous court child support order did not adjudicate claim of relief relating to one of the parties' children and merely lordered temporary child support for the
parties' other minor child pending further
order of court, court's decree did not fulfill
requirements of rule governing judgment in
case involving multiple claims for relief and
did not constitute a final judgment; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata could not
be invoked by the father to foreclose consideration of the mother's claim for past-due
payments at subsequent hearings. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b).
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant
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Sandra N. Peuler, Deputy Salt Lake
County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice:
The defendant appeals from that portion
of the district court's consolidated order
which requires him to pay $2,600 to the
plaintiff for child support and arrearages in
his support payments. We affirm the district court's order. All statutory references
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
On September 7, 1976, the district court
of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, issued a
divorce decree terminating the marriage of
the plaintiff and defendant, John W. Attebury. Pursuant to this decree, the plaintiff
was awarded custody of the couple's two
minor children, John David and John Joseph, and the defendant agreed to pay $250
per child per month for support of those
children.
Following the divorce, the children lived
with the plaintiff until October, 1977, when
John Joseph came to Salt Lake City to live
with the defendant. In March, 1978, John
David joined his brother, and the defendant, in Salt Lake City. Thereafter, the
children lived with the defendant in Utah
until December, 1978, when the plaintiff
resumed custody of them in Salt Lake City.
On December 9, 1978, John David and John
Joseph returned to Green River, Wyoming,
where they lived with friends until their
mother joined them there on January 1,
1979. The plaintiff and the two children
have lived together continually in Green
River from that time until the date of the
original hearing in this enforcement proceeding.
The plaintiff initiated the present proceedings on March 21, 1979, when she filed
a petition for support under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
77-61a-l et seq., requesting enforcement of
the Wyoming support decree. Prior to the
initial hearing in the matter which was held
on May 30, 1979, the parties entered into an
agreement stipulating to a reduction in the
required support money from $500 per

month to $300, with monthly payments of
$150 for the support of John Joseph to start
immediately. However, because of factual
questions concerning the possible emancipation of John David from the custody of the
plaintiff, the agreement reserved payment
of support for John David until that issue
could be investigated.
This agreement was to be incorporated
into the court's original order following the
May 30th hearing. However, the original
rendition of the agreement as laid out in
the court's order was incorrect and was
later amended by stipulation. A corrected
order was subsequently adopted by the district court on June 8, 1979. In both the
original and amended order, the defendant
was "temporarily ordered to pay the sum of
$150 for one child . . . for the support of
John Joseph, beginning with June, 1979.
Said payments shall continue each and every month thereafter until further order of
this court." The amendment to the order
concerned the scope of an investigation to
be undertaken by the Green River County
Attorney's office for factual data relating
to the possible emancipation of John David.
Following a hearing on August 22, 1979,
the district court entered a judgment and
decree on September 5, 1979, which ordered
the defendant to pay $150 a month for the
support of John David for the months of
August, September, October and November,
1979, and thereafter cease making such
payments because of the child's eighteenth
birthday. This decree further ordered the
continuation of the payments to John Joseph and entered a judgment of $2,000,
representing past due child support. After
this hearing, a motion was submitted by the
defendant requesting the order be amended
to identify the portions of the $2,000 judgment which were attributable to each particular child.
At the August hearing, the defendant
argued the judgment entered in the prior
hearing was res judicata regarding his liability for past support payments and precluded a new judgment granting arrearages. The court expressly refused to rule on
this issue but advised the defendant he
could present it at future proceedings.
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Following a hearing on the defendant's
motion to amend the order of September 5,
1979, the court denied the defendant's motion to set aside that judgment.
Finally, another hearing was held and a
consolidated judgment entered on February
22, 1980, merging all previous orders and
judgments. This consolidated order decreed that the defendant pay $150 per
month to John Joseph, commencing on June
1, 1979. The decree also ordered the defendant to pay a total amount of $600 for
the support of John David from August 1,
1979 through November 30, 1979. The order upheld the previous judgment granting
the plaintiff $2,000 in arrearages divided
equally between the children which represented unfulfilled payments due and owing
from February through May of 1979. The
order waived support payments for John
David for the months of June and July of
1979 because of his employment during
those months and arranged for payment of
the $2,600 by installments which would run
concurrently with the support payments for
John Joseph.
The district court's consolidated order
went on the declare:
" . . . [t]hat the defense of res judicata,
specifically that the order of May 31, [sic]
(30), 1979, was res judicata as to the
arrearages awarded in the Judgment and
Order of September 5, 1979, be and the
same is hereby determined to be not established."
The defendant's principal contentions on
appeal are: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering support for John
David; (2) John David is not entitled to
support because he was emancipated from
his mother's custody during the time in
question; and (3) the order of May 30,1979,
is res judicata and forecloses the consideration of past due support payments at subsequent hearings.
1. See Lamberth v. Lamberth, Utah, 550 P.2d
200 (1976).
2. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079
(1977)

[1,2] Turning to the first contention,
/e are reminded of the fact that pursuant
o 77-61a-7, this court must apply the laws
f Utah in determining the appropriateness
4f imposing a duty of support.1 Thus, while
support payments become unalterable debts
ais they accrue and a periodic installment
cannot be changed or modified after the
installment has become due,2 the trial court
nfray exercise its discretion in imposing a
duty of support prospectively.3

i

In determining the appropriateness of imposing a support duty, 78-45-7 outlines a
number of relevant factors which the court
must consider in exercising its discretion.
Specifically, 78-45-7 provides:
"(1) Prospective support shall be equal
to the amount granted by the prior court
order unless there has been a material
change of circumstances on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
"(2) When no prior court order exists,
br a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court in determining the
amount of prospective support shall consider all relevant factors including, but
not limited to:
"(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
"(b) the relative wealth and income
of the parties;
"(c) the ability of the obligor to
earn;
"(d) the ability of the obligee to
earn;
"(e) the need of the obligee;
"(f) the age of the parties;
"(g) the responsibility of the obligor
for the support of others."
[3] This Court will not disturb the trial
court's exercise of discretion unless we form
a definite and firm conviction that the
court below committed a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon
3. $ee 77-61a-24. ["If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order
the respondent to furnish support or reimbursement therefor .." (emphasis added)];
see also Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429
Pjd 35 (1967).
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a weighing of the relevant factors.4 Therefore, if the decision were on a consideration
of the relevant factors and not based upon
irrelevant or inappropriate considerations,
this Court will not reverse the trial court's
determination unless we are convinced that
the decision amounted to a clear error of
judgment.
[4] In the present case, the proceedings
were continued several times so that information concerning the whereabouts and living situation of John David could be ascertained. It appears from the record the
trial court considered the information which
was uncovered from these investigations
and other relevant factors in making its
decision to award John David prospective
support. Because the decision reached after a weighing of these factors does not
constitute a clear error of judgment we will
not disturb the district court's decision concerning John David's right to support.
[5] Similarly, the trial court's determination that John David was not emancipated from parental custody will not be disturbed on appeal. There was substantial
evidence presented at trial to support the
trial court's decision concerning the emancipation issue and this Court will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court
when those findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence.5
[6,7] The next contention advanced by
the defendant is that the judgment and
order which was entered by the court following the May 30, 1979, hearing is res
4. See Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522
(9th Cir. 1976); see also Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utah, 605 P.2d 1240
(1980); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979).
5. Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., Utah, 611 P.2d
1204 (1980); R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc. v. Myton Water Association, Utah,
563 P.2d 780 (1977); Town and Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin, Utah, 563 P.2d 195 (1977).
6. Olsen v. Board of Education of the Granite
School District, Utah, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338
(1977).
7. See Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, Utah, 572 P.2d 395, 397 (1977); In re
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P.2d

judicata and precludes any further assessment of past due support payments. In
this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata
renders a final judgment, on the merits, by
a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive
upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent
litigation of the same issues.6 Before the
doctrine is applicable, however, a final
judgment embracing all the issues must be
entered and preliminary or interim rulings
which do not represent a final determination do not rise to the dignity of res judicata.7
In deciding whether the court's order of
May 30 constitutes a final judgment and as
such invokes the doctrine of res judicata we
are guided by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states:
"When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third
party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In
the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of
the parties shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties, and the
105 (1958); see also C & H Construction &
Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 597
P.2d 1190 (1979); McAllister v. Charter First
Mortgage, Inc., 279 Or. 279, 567 P.2d 539, 542
(1977) ["Before res judicata applies, the prior
lawsuit must have ended in an 'adjudication of
issues which have culminated in a final decree.' " Quoting from Huszar v. Certified Realty Co., 272 Or. 517, 538 P.2d 57, 60 (1975)];
American Bank of Oklahoma v. Adams, Okl.,
514 P.2d 1191 (1973); Luisi Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Washington Utilities and Transportation
Comm., 72 Wash.2d 887, 435 P.2d 654 (1967);
State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Divi*
sion v. Copeland, 45 Or.App. 35, 607 P.2d 222
(1980).
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order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."

County, John F. Wahlquist, J., granting
partial relief in response to former detainer's petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking conditions of confinement at jail.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that:
[8] Because the May 30 order did not (1) former pretrial detainee had standing to
adjudicate the claim of relief relating to sue, even though he had moved beyond
John David and merely ordered temporary pretrial stage; (2) inadequate space and
support for the couple's other minor child other conditions inimical to maintenance of
pending "further order of this court," the health of detainees raised issues of constitucourt's decree does not fulfill the require- tional dimensions concerning conditions of
ments of Rule 54(b) and does not constitute incarceration; (3) confinement of pretrial
a final judgment. Therefore, the doctrine detainees in overcrowded area described as
of res judicata cannot be invoked by the maximum security cells of county jail raised
defendant to foreclose consideration of the serious constitutional issues as to detainee's
plaintiff's claim for past due payments at right of due process to be free from unduly
harsh and rigorous treatment; (4) failure to
the subsequent hearings.8
provide reasonable opportunity for exercise
The other issues advanced by the defend- also imposed harsh conditions of confineant on appeal are equally without merit and ment; and (5) procedures ordered by trial
the district court's consolidated order is, court would be continued and additional
therefore, affirmed.
procedures ordered to be adopted, if at all
practicable.
HALL, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur.
Remanded.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result

( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM}

J,

Mark WICKHAM, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
George FISHER, Weber County Sheriff,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16322.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 22, 1981.
Former pretrial detainee appealed from
order of the Second District Court, Weber
8. Cf. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P.
580, 588 (1925); State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59
P. 553 (1899), In Booth we explained; " ..
where the rights of the parties in an action, or a
distinct and independent branch thereof, are
determined by the court, and nothing is reserved for future determination, except what

1, Habeas Corpus <s=>9
Although former detainee had moved
beyond pretrial stage, where it was not
possible to adjudicate legality of conditions
complained of during period of pretrial detention, conditions at county jail giving rise
to| constitutional issues remained, and there
was strong public interest in having legality
of conditions settled, former pretrial detainee had standing to sue to challenge conditions of confinement at jail. U.S.C.A.
Cinst Amend. 8.
2. Action <to6, 13
The law does not provide exemption
from judicial scrutiny to unlawful acts
which are likely to be repeated on ground
that they do not fall within usual principles
of standing and justiciability.
may be necessary to enforce the judgment or
decision, the judgment is final." Id., 59 P. at
554. For a comprehensive review of early case
law on the question of what constitutes a final
judgment see Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381,
61 P.2d 1262 (1936).
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Leonard J. GARRAND, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Josephine Olivia GARRAND, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16622.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 10, 1980.
From order of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Peter F. Leary, J., requiring divorced husband to pay $150 per
month for support of his retarded son after
he became 21, husband appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held that: (1)
divorce decree, which required husband to
pay support for son until he was 21, was not
res judicata barring imposing obligation on
husband to pay support for son beyond age
of 21 on ground that he was retarded and
incapable of self-support; (2) imposing such
obligation on husband was justified, in light
of certain statute; and (3) requiring husband to pay $150 per month for support of
retarded son was not inequitable and did
not involve an excessive award.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce e=>310
Divorce decree, which required divorced husband to pay support for son until he
was 21, was not res judicata barring imposing an obligation on husband to pay support
for son beyond age of 21 on ground that he
was retarded and incapable of self-support,
in light of fact that such issue had not been
tried or determined in the divorce proceeding. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-2(4), 78-45-3, 78
45-4.
2. Divorce e=*310
Requiring divorced husband to pay support for son beyond age of 21 on ground
that he was retarded and incapable of selfsupport was justified, in light of statute
placing responsibility on parents for the
1. Utah. 581 P.2d 1012 (1978).

support of a child "of whatever age" if he
was incapacitated from earning a living and
without sufficient means. U.C.A.1953, 7845-2(4), 78-45-3, 78-45-4.
3. Appeal and Error e=>907(2)
Where no transcript of the evidence
before trial court had been brought to Supreme Court, such-Court would assume that
the evidence supported trial court's findings.
4. Divorce c=>309.6
In proceeding in which divorced husband was ordered to pay support for retarded child beyond the age of 21, requiring
husband to pay $150 per month for support
of such son was not inequitable and did not
involve an excessive award, in view of financial circumstances of the parties. U.C.
A.1953, 78 45 2(4), 78-45 -3, 78-45-4.

Stephen L. Johnston, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Richard L. Bird, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
This case is sequel to Garrand v. Garrand,1 wherein we reversed that part of the
divorce decree that terminated a support
award for a daughter on reaching the age
of 18. But the question involved in this
proceeding, as to support of the son Joseph
after he became 21, was not involved nor
dealt with in that case.
Thereafter, Josephine, the defendant
herein, initiated a separate action (consolidated below with a petition for modification
of the divorce decree). She sought to require plaintiff herein, Leonard, to provide
support for their son Joseph beyond the age
of 21 years on the ground that the latter is
retarded and incapable of self-support.
The separate action is based on the provisions of Chapter 45, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
known as the Civil Liability for Support
Act. Sections 3 and 4 require that the
father and the mother support each other
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and their minor children. And Sec. 78-452(4) states thereof that
"Child" means a son or daughter under
the age of twenty-one years and a son or
daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means. [Emphasis added.]
Upon appropriate hearing and consideration of the matter, the trial court ordered
the father, plaintiff Leonard, to pay $150
per month to support his son, Joseph (no
one questions that he is retarded and incapable of self-support), after he became 21.
On appeal, the father urges: (1) that
inasmuch as the divorce decree awarded
support for Joseph until he was 21, that was
res judicata on that issue; and (2) insufficiency of the evidence to support the decree.
[1] As to (1), above: The issue presented and decided in the prior proceeding related to the support of the children during
their minority. It does not appear that the
issue, as to the obligation of the plaintiff
Leonard to support the son Joseph after the
latter had attained the age of 21, nor of the
son's right to receive such support, was
tried or determined therein. Joseph is now
21, when it would normally be expected
that he would have become self-supporting.
But the fact is that he has not, and he is
without means of support and will become
an object of charity, or a burden on public
welfare, unless that responsibility is placed
upon his parents, including his father, as
does this adjudication.
[2] There is a firm foundation for the
judgment of the trial court in the statute
quoted above. It expressly fixes responsibility for support of a child "of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means" upon
his parents. Correlated to the foregoing
and in further support of the trial court's
ruling, this Court has recognized that when
a child is so limited, either physically or
mentally, that he is unable to support him2. See Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525
(1976), and authorities therein cited. This principle was also stated and reaffirmed in the later
case of Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864
(1978).

self when he reaches his majority, his parents may be required to provide support
beyond tfhat time.2
[3,4] As to the plaintiffs challenge to
the sufficiency of evidence: There has been
no transcript of the evidence brought to
this Couirt; and in the absence thereof we
assume ^hat it supports the findings of the
trial court.3 However, we make the observation that, in view of the financial circumstances of the parties as shown in our prior
decision in this case, it does not appear that
$150 per month to provide for a retarded
child wdmld be excessive or inequitable.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
MAUGHAN, HALL and WILKINS, JJ.,
and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur.
STEWART, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.

The WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Ralph MARCHANT, Darve Miller, and
Sherman Peterson, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 16512.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 11, 1980.

Automobile liability insurer, which
claimed that injured employee was an employee of insured and thus excluded under
3. Whtkms v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385
P.2cJ 154 (1963).
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sources of water supply owned or controlled
by them, and all such assets must be preserved, maintained, and operated for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges.
By statute,3 municipalities shall not be
required to furnish water for use, even to
its own inhabitants, unless an application
therefor is made in writing and signed by
the owner of the place to be served. The
plaintiffs in this case have not made any
application in writing or otherwise for
water service, and Salt Lake City has neither agreed to furnish, nor furnished, any
water to the plaintiffs or any of them.
What the city can do and does is to sell its
surplus water to water districts; 4 and those
districts in turn furnish water to residents
who reside within the boundaries of the
distnct.
The fact that Salt Lake County and the
various water conservancy districts therein
permit their residents to depend upon the
surplus water supplied by Salt Lake City is
no reason to grant a judgment to these
plaintiffs. Such a ruling will require Salt
Lake City to continue to furnish them with
water when the city no longer has a surplus
to sell. It is, and should be, the responsibility of those who undertake to furnish water
to their residents to secure water rights in
their own names which they may do by
purchase, through eminent domain proceedings, or by digging wells. They cannot
expect the courts to compel a city to sell
water when it has none for sale or when it
does not care to sell its surplus, if any it
has The city commissioners are the ones to
decide whether the city will or should sell
water and that is not, and ought not to be,
a matter of concern to the courts.
I would remand this case with directions
to the trial court to grant the Motion to
Dismiss. No costs should be awarded to
either party.
Vw\
(o
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1O-7-10, U C A , 1953 as amended.
Utah Rep 564-572 P 2d—12

Maxine L. MECHAM and the State of
Utah, by and through Utah State Department of Social Services, Plaintiffs
and Appellant,
v.
Richard Lynn MECHAM, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 14910.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 28, 1977.

Utah State Department of Social Services brought action against husband for reimbursement of support furnished to wife
and child. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., dismissed
the action without prejudice to the Department. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J.,
held that. (1) public support of children
statute was not the proper procedure to
modify a decree of divorce and (2) failure to
plead for reimbursement of money expended in support of child and denial of past and
present alimony was res judicata as to husband's duty of support and Department of
Social Services could not commence suit for
funds paid to wife.
Affirmed.
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which Ellett, C. J., concurred.

h Divorce <s=>309
Where trial court determined the
amount to be paid under duty of support,
public support of children statute was not
the proper procedure to modify a decree of
divorce. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-1 et seq.
2. Social Security and Public Welfare
<s=>ll
Department of Social Services has only
the right to enforce the amount of support
4.

10-8-14, U C A., 1953 as amended
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due from the obligee to obligor and Department may not unilaterally determine that
amount and then seek reimbursement.
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.
3. Divorce e=>255
Where former wife had pleaded for
temporary alimony and divorce decree denied past and present alimony, divorce decree was res judicata as to husband's duty
to support former wife and Department of
Social Services could not commence suit for
funds paid to former wife. U.C.A.1953, 7845-7.
4. Divorce <s=>308
Where former wife pleaded for temporary child support but did not seek reimbursement of money expended for support
of child, divorce decree was res judicata as
to husband's duty to support child between
filing of divorce action and entry of decree
and Department of Social Services could
not commence suit for funds paid to child
prior to date of decree. U.C.A.1953, 78-454.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Stephen G.
Schwendiman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellant.
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Before us is an order which dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. The trial court correctly interpreted the law, and we sustain
its judgment.
Maxine L. Mecham filed a complaint for
divorce on July 6, 1973. Defendant husband, was served August 30, 1973. In the
complaint, plaintiff sought temporary alimony and child support. A decree of divorce was entered March 15, 1974. The
record does not indicate that plaintiff pursued her demand for temporary alimony or
support. The decree provided:
The plaintiff is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed to be denied any
right whatsoever to alimony for the past
the present or the future forevermore, as

the rigjht to alimony is affected by the
marital relationship existing between the
parties I to this action. . . .
. . . Both the plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to assume
and pay any and all debts incurred by
themselves respectfully (sic) since the filing of the divorce complaint in this matter and to hold the other party free from
harm thereon.
The decree further ordered defendant to
pay plaintiff $75 per month as child support
for the parties' minor child.
In August 1973, Maxine Mecham began
receiving welfare payments from the Department of Social Services for both herself
and the child at the rate of $162.00 per
month. She continued receiving these payments through September 1974. The Department of Social Services filed a complaint, which was served on March 5, 1975,
pleading for reimbursement for the welfare
payments made to Maxine Mecham. The
department's claim was predicated on Section 78-4&-9, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1975,
which grants it- the right to proceed on
behalf of the obligee to enforce the right of
support against the obligor.
The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice to plaintiff's right to intervene in the divorce action, so the department might proceed to enforce any rights
Maxine Hecham might have against Richard Mecham for nonpayment of the support
ordered, and to the extent to which the
state might be entitled under the divorce
decree.
However, in regard to the right of reimbursement for the sums paid in the interim
between the filing of the divorce complaint
and the entry of the decree, the trial court
ruled:
. . . There is a distinction to be
drawn between the statutory 'duty* of
support and the statutory proceedings under which the amount of that support is
to be fixed. If not otherwise fixed as in
a divorce decree or a similar judgment,
the amount to be paid by an obligor may
be determined either by court proceed-
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ings under Chapter 45 [Title 78] or by
administrative procedures under 45(b)
[45b]. In either case the department may
proceed on behalf of the obligee. But in
neither case can the department proceed
to get a judgment against one owing a
duty of support for welfare handouts
when there has been no prior determination of the amount of support to be paid,
and particularity] where, as in the case
before the court, there has been a decree
of divorce previously entered fixing the
amount of support and/or alimony to be
paid.
[1] The trial court in its ruling stated
that in the decree of divorce entered on
March 15, 1974, the court had ordered defendant to pay Maxine Mecham $75.00 per
month child support and that he should pay
no alimony. The trial court ruled the divorce decree fixed the amount to be paid
under defendant's duty of support, and no
further proceedings are required or allowed
to otherwise change that determination, except a petition to modify the divorce decree
because of a change of circumstances. The
trial court ruled that a complaint under
Chapter 45 of Title 78 is not the proper
procedure to modify a decree of divorce.
We agree.
[2] Under Chapter 45, Title 78, the duty
of support of the obligor is to the obligee.
The state department of Social Services has
only the right to enforce the amount of
support which is due the obligee from the
obligor.1 The department may not unilaterally determine that amount and then enforce the right of reimbursement by an
action under Chapter 45. Under Chapter
45, the district court determines the amount
due for support, after considering the relevant factors, some of which are specified in
Section 78-45-7.
1. Sec 78-45b-l et seq. was enacted in 1975
and went into effect May 13, 1975 and Sec.
78-45-9 was amended to its present form. At
the time the department paid Maxine and the
date the department filed its complaint. Sec.
78-45-9, provided "The obligee may enforce
his right of support against the obligor and the
state department of [public welfare] may pro-

[3,4] As to reimbursement for the support furnished to Maxine Mecham, the department's rights are derivative and no
greater than Maxine's rights. In her complaint, Maxine pleaded for temporary alimony. In the decree, she was denied past
and present alimony; defendant's duty of
support was determined, and the matter is
res judicata. The department cannot file a
complaint one year after a court has determined the amount of support (in this case
nothing), and demand reimbursement under
Chapter 45. The same principle applies to
the child support which accumulated prior
to the date of the decree, March 15, 1974.
Maxine had pleaded in her complaint for
temporary child support; there was no provision made in the decree for any sum expended for the support of the child from
August 1973 to March 15, 1974. Maxine
also had a duty to support the child, Section
78-45-4. Under the decree, she was ordered to assume and pay any and all debts
she had incurred since the filing of the
complaint and to hold her husband harmless. Maxine did not seek in the decree any
sum for reimbursement for the money she
had expended for the support of the child,
although she had put the matter in issue in
her pleading. The rights of the department
are derived through Maxine—the matter is
res judicata.
WILKINS, and HALL, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting).
It is important to bear in mind that this
is not a suit in which the Department of
Social Services joined with the plaintiff in a
divorce action. It is one in which the Department brought its own and separate action for reimbursement for reasonable support it had furnished to the defendant's
family in necessitous circumstances. Whatever rights it has and asserts in its own
ceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his
right of support against the obligor. Whenever
the state department of welfare furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same nght as the
obligee to whom the support was furnished, for
the purpose of securing reimbursement and of
obtaining continuing support. . . ."
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separate action should not be in any way
dependent upon nor adversely affected by
any determination made in the divorce action, to which it was not a party; likewise,
the adjudication of any issue in the other
action is not res judicata in this action.1
The issue involved here is the right of the
Department to reimbursement for support
furnished the wife, Maxine Mecham, during
the time of the marriage and prior to the
granting of the divorce. (Inasmuch as the
defendants duty to support her was terminated by the divorce decree on March 15,
1974, no contention is made of the Department's entitlement to reimbursement from
defendant for support furnished after that
date.)
It is so plain as to be uncontestable that
under the common law the husband and
father always had a duty to support his
family, both his wife and children;2 and
that under our statutory law, both husband
and wife have a duty to support each other
and their children.3 It is also well established that where such dependents are left
in hunger, or in want of the necessities of
life, anyone who comes to their rescue and
supplies their needs has a right to reimbursement from the one who had the legal
duty of support.4 Therefore, the Department or anyone else who so comes to the
rescue should be able to furnish necessities
and seek reimbursement therefore.5
1. 60 A.L.R.2d at 59.
2. Rees v Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P2d
788 (1957); State Division of Family Services
v. Clark, Utah, 554 P 2d 1310 (1976), Barrett v.
Barrett, 44 Anz. 509, 39 P 2d 621 (1934), 67
C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15; 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 15.
3. Sec. 30-2-9, U.C.A.1953, Sections 78-45-3
and 4, U.C.A.1953
4. See Sec. 78-45-9, U C.A.1953 (Pocket Supp);
and also Sec. 78-45b-3, which provides: "Department of social services—Powers and
duties.—(1) In the event that assistance is furnished by the department, the department shall
become trustee of any cause of action of the
obligee or any minor child in that obligee's
custody, to recover support due to that obligee
from any person and may bring and maintain
the action either in its own name or in the
name of the obligee." (Emphasis added), and
see Baggs v. Anderson, Utah, 528 P2d 141;

It Mso should be borne in mind that the
purpdse of the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act 6 was to provide a means for
compelling those responsible to support
their families. Particularly Section 7845-9 1 was intended to increase and facilitate the ability of the Department to compel stich support by obtaining reimbursement for support it had furnished. There is
nothing in the language of the statute
which indicates or intimates an intent to
abrogate or diminish the Department's ability to accomplish that objective. On the
contrary, both its purpose and its permissive language made it abundantly clear that
the statute was not intended to limit or
curtail the already existing right of reimbursement. This is expressly set forth in
Section 7&-45-12 which provides: "The
rights herein created are in addition to and
not in substitution to any other right"
[Emphasis added.]
The above-cited rules of statutory and
decisional law relating to the duty of the
father to support his family and the right
of one who supplies necessities to seek reimbursement from him arise out of social necessity and sound public policy. If rescuers
could not seek reimbursement, they would
be discouraged from doing so and families
may be left in dire need.
State\Division of Family Services v. Clark, supra; Strafford v Field, 70 Idaho 331, 218 P2d
338 (1950), West v West, 114 Okl. 279, 246 P
599 (1926); Rogers v. Rogers, 93 Kan. 114, 143
P. 410 (1914); 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife
§ 50, 67 CJ.S. Parent and Child § 16.
5. "A public authority that has supported a wife
living apart from her husband has a common
law rejmedy against the husband
. The
rule applies to support furnished to her as
public assistance." 41 Am.Jur.2d, Husband
and Wife, Sec. 350. See also 60 A.L.R.2d 7
6. Chap. 110, SL.U 1957, now in our code as
Sec. 78-45-1 et seq, U.C.A.1953.
7. ". i, . t h e state department of social services may proceed pursuant to this act or any
other applicable statute, either on its own behalf or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the
obligee's right of support against the obligor "
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Reflection will reveal the incongruity and
impracticality of ruling otherwise. Suppose
that because of independent wealth or income of a plaintiff mother, or by collusion
or whatever cause, the court should decree
in the divorce proceeding that the father
should pay only $1 per year, or any other
nominal award, for support of his wife, or
of his child. Suppose further that conditions change and the latter become in hunger or want; and further, the Department
Cor anyone else) provided support to the
extent of any amount that proved to be
reasonable and necessary. It is conceivable
that anyone would argue that the rescuer
could only be reimbursed to the extent of $1
per month, because it was so determined in
a divorce proceeding, to which the rescuer
was not a party. It is submitted that the
only answer comfortable to law, logic and
justice is that the rescuer could proceed as
expressly authorized under Section 78-45-9
to seek reimbursement for necessities it had
furnished. The defendant father would of
course be entitled to appear and defend and
would be liable only for whatever was
shown to be reasonable and necessary.
There is the further aspect of this problem to be considered. If the rescuer who
has furnished necessities (in this instance
the Department) can have his rights affected or cut off in the divorce proceeding, a
high likelihood is that that will be done.
The wife would have no incentive to seek
an award for past support money. She
wouid have been supported by the rescuer,
(the Department); and any payments for
past support that she was to receive would
go to reimburse the Department, with no
benefit to her. But since she may have the
right to recover for such back support, she
could propose to forego her claim to it in
the divorce action in return for some other
benefit. The result of this is that the parties could cheat the department out of its
right to reimbursement, without the Department being a party'to, represented in,
or having anything to say about such collusion.
What has been said above confirms the
reasoning that what happens in the divorce
proceeding should not and could not proper-

ly have any adverse effect upon rights
which had already been acquired by the
Department during the time of the marriage and up to the time of the divorce. As
above indicated, it is of course different
after the divorce is granted and the defendant no longer has any duty to support the
wife.
On the basis of what has been said herein, it is my opinion that the trial court
improperly dismissed this action and that
the defendant and the Department are entitled to a trial on the issues as to whether
and how much it was reasonably required
to furnish support to Mrs. Mecham when
the defendant was responsible for her support, i. e., during the marriage and prior to
the entry of the divorce decree.
I would remand for that purpose.
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of CROCKETT, J.

Leora M. GULLEY and the State of Utah,
By and Through Utah State Department
of Social Services, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Guy M. GULLEY, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 14789.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 30, 1977.
State Department of Social Services
appealed from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H.
Croft, J., dismissing its petition for reimbursement for support furnished to the children and former wife of defendant The
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that: an

ROBERTS v. ROBERTS
Cite as 5^2 P 2d

sequently, notwithstanding the purported
declaration of termination filed on behalf of
Betty N. Nelson, the joint tenancy ownership with her husband, plaintiff Douglas
Nelson continued to exist until her death,
and then vested in him as the survivor.
[4] The facts are undisputed that defendant Michelle Davis knew that the home
in question was an asset of the marital
estate being dealt with in the divorce action; and that she knew of the interdiction
against it being conveyed or transferred
until the court's adjudication concerning it.
Consequently, because of that actual knowledge, any interest she may have acquired
by the quit claim deed, was subject to the
disposition of the property to be made in
that action.
[5] Consistent with and further supportive of the determination made by the trial
court is its finding that there was "no evidence of delivery" to the defendant of her
mother's quit claim deed, which would be
essential to its vesting of any interest in
her.3
We say what we have said herein advisedly, notwithstanding defendant's contention that the order of November 4,1976,
that her mother "may convert the joint
tenancy to a tenancy in common" became
res judicata because that order was never
appealed from. From what has been said
above it is obvious that there was never any
such conversion of the joint tenancy to a
tenancy in common, either by the purported
declaration of termination of joint tenancy,
or by the abortive attempt to deed the
property to defendant Michelle Davis.
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the same as defendant's mother would have
done ii she had survived her husband. In
regard to any rights in the property that
her mother may have acquired in the divorce action, the principle announced by
this Court in the case of Daly v. Daly* is
applicable: that when the death of one or
both parties to a divorce action occurs during th|e pendency of the action, the action
itself abates and their status, including
their property rights, reverts to what it had
been before the action was filed.
On the basis of the discussion herein, it is
our conclusion that the defendant has failed
to disbharge the burden which is hers of
demonstrating that the court committed error w,hich would justify reversal of the
judgment5
Affirmed.
dent),

Costs to plaintiff (respon-

MAUGHAN, WILKINS,
STEWART, JJ., concur.

HALL

and
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Debbrah Kim ROBERTS, and the State of
Utah, By and Through Utah State Department of Social Services, Plaintiffs
an^l Appellants,
v.
Robert Glen ROBERTS, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 15546.

[6] Defendant's alternative contention
is that, even if she does not take by the
deed, she should be entitled to succeed to
her mother's interest in the property as the
executrix of her estate and her heir. As
has been explained above, upon the death of
her mother, plaintiff became the owner of
the home as the surviving joint tenant, just

State, through Department of Social
Services, sought reimbursement of funds
paid for support of divorced parties' minor

3. Givan v Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P2d
959

5. See Charlton v. HacketU 11 Utah 2d 389, 360
P2d 176.

4. Utah, 533 P.2d 884.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 6, 1979.
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child prior to their divorce. The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., denied reimbursement and state appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J.,
held that state, which was made party to
divorce action before court's order fixing
amount of child support to be paid by husband, was entitled to reimbursement of
funds expended for support of such child
prior to child support order to extent of
husband's support obligations.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Crockett, C. J., filed opinion in which
he concurred in the result.
Hall and Stewart, JJ., concurred in result
Social

The parties stipulated to the facts in this
case, which are as follows. Plaintiff Deborah Roberts filed an action for divorce on
July 11, 1977. She thereafter sought and
received public assistance payments during
August, September and October, 1977,
amounting to $166 per month for the support of the minor child of plaintiff and
defendant. On October 12, 1977, the divorce action was heard in the district court,
but the matter of child support was reserved for hearing on October 25. The
Utah State Department of Social Services
filed a motion for joinder under Rule 19,
and pursuant to a stipulation by the parties
in open court on October 25, the court
granted the motion to join the State as a
plaintiff. The State asserts it is entitled to
reimbursement for sums paid to defendant
on behalf of the minor child prior to the
entry of the court's order fixing the amount
of child support to be paid defendant.

Security and Public Welfare
<s=> 194.19
State, which was made party to divorce
action before court's order fixing amount of
child support to be paid by husband, was
Defendant contends the State cannot be
entitled to reimbursement of funds expend- reimbursed for any sums paid before the
ed for support of such child prior to child entry of a court order fixing the amount of
support order to extent of husband's sup- support money to be paid by defendant.
port obligations. (Per Maughan, J., with one All parties stipulated that if the State is
Justice concurring and three Justices con- entitled to reimbursement, the amount per
curring in the result.) U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7 month would be limited to the amount per
(3), 78-45-9.
month fixed by the district court as child
support.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
The trial court ordered defendant to pay
City, Ray E. Gammon, Deputy County $110 per month as child support, beginning
Atty., Utah County, Provo, for the State. in November of 1977, and held that, based
Maxwell A. Miller, Provo, for Deborah upon Mecham v. Mecham, supra, the Department of Social Services was not entitled
Roberts.
Ronald R. Stanger, Provo, for defendant to any reimbursement for sums paid before
the entry of the order.
and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
This is an action by the State of Utah,
through the State Department of Social
Services for reimbursement of sums paid
for the support of the minor child of Deborah and Robert Roberts prior to their divorce. The district court denied reimbursement on the basis of Mecham v. Mecham,
Utah, 570 P.2d 123 (1977). We affirm in
part and reverse in part. All statutory
references are to U.C.A.1953, as amended.

Mecham v. Mecham involved a suit by the
Department of Social Services, pursuant to
78-45-9, for assistance payments made to
the wife for herself and a child. The payments were made both before and after the
entry of the divorce decree on March 15,
1974. The decree denied any alimony to the
wife, and ordered the husband to pay $75
per month prospective child support. We
held the Department's right to reimbursement was no greater than the wife's right
to support, and thus it could not begin an
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action, after the entry of the decree fixing
the alimony and child support to be paid,
and seek amounts in excess of those provided for by the court. The Department was
therefore prevented from obtaining any reimbursement for payments made to the
wife, since no alimony was awarded by the
court; no reimbursement was allowed for
payments made on behalf of the child before the entry of the decree because the
decree made no such provision.
Mecham does not prevent the State from
ever obtaining reimbursement for sums expended by the State prior to a court decree.
Rather, it merely holds the State's right to
reimbursement is derivative of the person
entitled to support, and is limited to the
amount of support fixed by a court. Because the district court assessed no child
support payments against defendant until
after the effective date of the decree, the
State was not entitled to reimbursement for
those sums expended for the child before
the decree.
In 1977, the Legislature added 78-457(3), which reads:
(3) When no prior court order exists,
the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) The amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any;
(b) The funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in support of spouse and children.
This amendment indicates an intent by the
Legislature that the State be allowed to
recover all sums expended by the State on
behalf of an obligee spouse and children
prior to a court order. Here, the State was
made a party before the court's order fixing
the amount of child support to be paid, and
should be reimbursed for sums expended on
behalf of the child.
However, the above amendment would
constitute a denial of due process to the
obligor spouse if the court assessed the obligor for all public assistance benefits received by the obligee, without considering
relevant factors such as the relative wealth
1. 78-45b-l et seq.

and income of the parties; and the ability
of the parties to earn income. Under 7845-7(2), seven such factors are required to
be considered in determining the amount of
prospective support. Under the Public Support of Children Act,1 which provides an
administrative procedure for obtaining reimbursement for assistance payments made
on behalf of minor children, similar factors
must be considered in the hearing to determine th4 extent of the parent's liability for
child subport.2 The assessment of arrearages under 78-45-7(3) must also be subject
to a consideration of the same factors.
In thijs case, the district court, after consideration of the factors in 78-45-7(2), determined the amount of support to be $110
per mopth; the State is therefore to be
reimbursed by defendant in that amount
for assistance provided from August
through October, 1977.
WILKINS, J., concurs.
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur in result.
CRdCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in
result)*
I agfee that the court having determined
the reasonable and proper amount of support to be $110 per month, that is the
amount for which the State Department of
Social Services should be reimbursed in this
case. However, I cannot agree with the
proposition that "the state's right to reimbursement is derivative of the person entitled to support." Section 78-45-7(3) enacted in 11977 referred to in the main opinion
does iot so indicate. That statute, and the
main opinion which recognizes the change
in th0 law, both impress me as a commendable improvement over the law as declared in
the Mecham case, which the opinion cites.
But |t is obvious that the intent and purpose |of that statute was to supplement the
right1 of the State to recover for support
furnished to dependents, and not to any
way |limit or diminish it.
2. 7$-45b-6(2).
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It is my opinion that the following proposition is incontrovertibly supported by law,
logic and justice: that whenever dependents are left in necessitous circumstances,
anyone who comes to their rescue (including
the State Department of Social Services)
has the right to reimbursement from the
one who had the legal duty of support; and
therefore the Department, or anyone else
who so comes to rescue, should be able to
furnish things which are reasonable and
necessary for the sustenance of such a dependent and to obtain reimbursement
therefor; and that this is true whether
furnished before or after a decree of divorce and irrespective of whether there is
one or not and without necessarily being
bound by any adjudication to which the
furnisher was not a party. See discussion
and authorities cited in the dissent in the
Mecham case.
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Richard Michael ROSS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Carol Dee ROSS, Defendant
and Respondent,
and
Utah State Department of Social
Services, Intervenor.
Nos. 15800, 15830.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 9, 1979.
Ex-husband brought suit to modify
California divorce decree, and ex-wife counterclaimed for accrued but unpaid alimony
and child support. The bureau of recovery
services intervened seeking reimbursement
from plaintiff for assistance payments
made to his ex-wife. The Third District

Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J.,
rendered judgment awarding $24,457 to exwife, $1,544 to the state, and plaintiff appealed. On cross appeal, wife sought reversal of that part of the judgment granting
ex-husband a credit against accrued alimony. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held
that: (1) no evidence was presented that
ex-wife or the bureau of recovery services
made implicit or explicit statements on
which ex-husband could reasonably rely to
the effect that accrued but unpaid support
payments were waived; nor was ex-husband misled by ex-wife's conduct in attempting a reconciliation; accordingly,
there was no waiver or acquiescence, and
the principles of equitable estoppel did not
apply; (2) ex-husband was not entitled to
credit for expenditures made on behalf of
the children or his ex-wife which did not
specifically conform to the terms of the
divorce decree, and (3) alimony and child
support which accrued during the time the
parties and their children lived together in
a good faith yet unsuccessful attempt at
reconciliation would not be abated, as the
evidence failed to establish that the ex-husband supported his family during the reconciliation period.
Affirmed on appeal; reversed on cross
appeal.
1. Appeal and Error <s=*893(2), 895(2)
In an equitable proceeding, it is the
prerogative of the Supreme Court to review
the facts as well as the law, but it does not
overturn the district court's findings unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against
them. Const, art. 8, § 9.
2. Divorce <e=>311.5
No evidence was presented that exwife or the bureau of recovery services
made implicit or explicit statements on
which ex-husband could reasonably rely to
the effect that accrued but unpaid support
payments were waived; nor was ex-husband misled by ex-wife's conduct in attempting a reconciliation; accordingly,
there was no waiver or acquiescence, and
the principles of equitable estoppel did not
apply.

